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I. ALL ABOARD!: THE CRAZED TRIP AHEAD 
Just two hours east of Dallas, Texas along Interstate 20 lies the small 
town of Marshall, Texas.1 Marshall is home to the East Texas Baptist 
University Tigers, boxer George Foreman, and 24,500 people.2 Despite its 
small size, Marshall played a tremendous role in allowing the Eastern 
District of Texas to make a name for itself. That name, of course, is the 
“Rocket Docket.”3 As the district hears more than half of the nation’s patent 
infringement cases, there is a reason for the Eastern District’s fame.4 
On September 15, 2016, a jury in Tyler, Texas, just a half hour west of 
Marshall, awarded $22 million to Cellular Communications Equipment, 
LLC in a patent infringement suit against Apple Incorporated.5 This instance 
is not the first time a jury in the Eastern District of Texas has awarded this 
amount in damages.6 In fact, this occurs quite frequently.7 Jury verdicts like 
these have brought companies just like Cellular Communications all the way 
to Marshall and Tyler.8 The Eastern District is not the only venue that is 
popular among these types of businesses, but it hears the most patent 
litigation from companies like Cellular Communications.9  
Acacia Research, Cellular Communications’ parent company, is quite 
successful. Since refocusing its business plan in 2000, it has generated $1.3 
 
 1.  See Driving Directions from Dallas, TX to Marshall, TX, GOOGLE MAPS, 
https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Dallas,+TX/Marshall,+TX/@32.5832455,-96.7093053,8z (search 
starting point field for “Dallas, TX” and search destination field for “Marshall, TX”). 
 2.  See About, EAST TEXAS BAPTIST UNIVERSITY, https://www.etbu.edu/about (last visited Jan. 19, 
2017). 
 3.  Loren Steffy, Patently Unfair, TEX. MONTHLY (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/patently-unfair. 
 4.  See generally 2015 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW REPORT, LEX MACHINA (Mar. 16, 
2016), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/2015-patent-litigation-year-in-review-report. 
 5.  See Marc Schneider, Apple Hit With $22 Million Verdict in Latest ‘Patent Troll’ Case, 
BILLBOARD (Sept. 21, 2016) http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7518025/apple-hit-with-22-
million-verdict-in-latest-patent-troll-case. 
 6.  CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: ARE 
WE AT AN INFLECTION POINT? 15 (2016), available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 7.  See generally id. 
 8.  See generally id. 
 9.  See 2015 PATENT DISPUTE REPORT, UNIFIED PATENTS (Dec. 31, 2015), 
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report; see also 2015 PATENT 
LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 4. 
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billion in revenue.10 They do not provide any services.11 Acacia Research, 
instead, litigates and licenses patents.12 This business plan has proven to be 
truly polarizing, as some companies have adopted it, while others have 
condemned it.13 This business model is so controversial that it has started a 
persistent wave of patent reform legislation in Congress just to stop it.14 
One of the major ways that those who oppose this type of business 
model are attempting to use to slow down companies like Acacia Research 
is to prevent them from bringing cases in the Eastern District of Texas.15 The 
latest attempts to keep cases out of the Eastern District of Texas involve 
changing the procedural rules, particularly the special venue rule for patent 
infringement, to disallow most of the cases that the district hears.16   
This Comment explores the litigation and legislation revolving around 
nonpracticing entities such as Acacia Research and their favorite forum for 
a patent duel, the Eastern District of Texas. Part II gives a brief orientation 
to the world of non-practicing entities, describing the different types and 
their differing intentions. This section will also give a brief introduction into 
exactly why the Eastern District of Texas is so popular for patent 
infringement litigation, proposed patent venue legislation, and the conflict 
between two current venue statutes. These two statutes will be the main focus 
of this Comment due to their potential impact on litigation in the Eastern 
District as well as on nonpracticing entities. Part III will evaluate the special 
venue statute for patent infringement and explore the situations that give rise 
to other special venue statutes for comparison. Part IV will discuss a two-
part solution to the issues relating to the special venue statute and aggressive 
nonpracticing entities. This two-part solution involves repealing the current 
special venue statute for patent infringement to rely solely on the general 
venue statute and incentivizing inventors to assign their patents to operating 
companies.  
 
 10.  See generally Overview, ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., http://acaciaresearch.com/about-
us/#overview (last visited Jan. 19, 2017); see also History, ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., 
http://acaciaresearch.com/history/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017). 
 11.  See generally id. 
 12.  See generally id. 
 13.  See generally Patent Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-
patent-troll-victims (last visited Jan. 19, 2017); see also Ira Blumberg, Why Patent Trolls Won’t Give Up, 
TECH CRUNCH, (June 5, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/05/why-patent-trolls-wont-give-up/. 
 14.  See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015); Trade Protection Not Troll Protection 
Act, H.R. 4829, 114th Cong. (2016); Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act, H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
 15.  See, e.g., H.R. 9; Venue Equality and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act, S. 2733, 114th Cong. 
(2016) (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 17, 2016). 
 16.  Id. 
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II. THE PASSENGERS AND THE GOLDEN TICKET: BACKGROUND 
ON PATENT INFRINGEMENT VENUE AND THE ENTITIES WHO 
CHOOSE IT  
A. Crossing the Bridge: The Patent Troll Issue 
Nonpracticing entities (NPEs), often known as patent trolls, are 
business entities that do not make or create products that use, or “practice,” 
the patents that they hold.17 These can include research entities that are 
involved in commercial or educational research and development and take 
out patents to protect their research.18 These research entities then license the 
patented technology to help fund other research and to facilitate technology 
transfer.19 However, there are NPEs whose sole business model revolves 
around patent licensing and litigation instead of producing and selling 
products.20 The end-goal of this model is to have other companies license the 
patent, often with the threat of expensive and potentially lengthy litigation.21 
This model can be very lucrative.22 For example, Company A is in the 
business of producing tires for cars and has discovered a great new design 
for such tires. An NPE who owns a patent for a similar, if not the exact, 
design can bring an infringement suit against Company A. Faced with the 
average cost of litigation ranging from $1 million to $6 million, Company A 
would be forced to negotiate a license from the NPE or abandon the design 
altogether.23 
These types of NPEs usually structure themselves as shell companies 
where the NPE distributes money to other entities.24 So if Company A were 
to get a judgment against the NPE, it is likely that the NPE would not have 
 
 17.  See Nonpracticing Entity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a 
nonpracticing entity as a “person or company that acquires patents with no intent to use, further develop, 
produce, or market the patented invention”). 
 18.  See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 327 (2010) (“A research and development 
entity is a non-practicing patentee that develops its own technology.”). 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  Robin Feldman, The Pace of Change: Non-practicing Entities and the Shifting Legal 
Landscape, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 635, 636 (2015) [hereinafter The Pace of Change]. Businesses that actually 
make and sell products are known as operating companies. See 2015 Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIED 
PATENTS (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report 
(defining an operating company as a “[c]ompany which derives most of its total revenue from Product 
Sales or Services.”). 
 21.  See The Pace of Change, supra note 20, at 636–37. 
 22.  Id. at 636. 
 23.  Report of the Economic Survey 2007, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, LAW PRAC. MGMT. COMM., 
at I-91 (2007). 
 24.  The Pace of Change, supra note 20, at 636. 
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assets available to pay it. This situation results in pressure for operating 
companies to either purchase a license from the NPE or settle if the NPE is 
asserting its patent rights against the company.25  
NPEs have seen increasing litigation in the past few years. In 2007, 
NPEs filed roughly 25% of all patent lawsuits.26 This number rose to nearly 
60% in 2012.27 As such, there have been attempts to reduce the number of 
suits brought by NPEs through different procedural rules. One attempt was 
in the America Invents Act (AIA) which, among other things, changed the 
joinder rules in patent cases.28 The AIA limits joinder of defendants if the 
plaintiff is seeking joint or several relief, or if the claims against each 
defendant arise out of the same transaction.29 In certain jurisdictions before 
the AIA, plaintiffs could join multiple defendants if deciding the patent’s 
scope would provide sufficient basis for the joinder, even if the individual 
infringements were not related.30 This new joinder rule, however, was not 
effective as NPEs still brought a majority of patent infringement cases in the 
United States. The method to limit NPEs shifted to a different procedural 
matter—venue. This shift was caused by the overwhelming number of suits 
brought in one particular forum. 
B. The Texan Patent Express: The Eastern District of Texas 
Despite there being ninety-four federal districts that have jurisdiction to 
hear these patent cases, about half of the patent cases filed in 2015—2,541 
of 5,819 cases—occurred in the Eastern District of Texas.31 This massive 
number of filings made the Eastern District the top venue for patent disputes 
in 2015.32 NPEs were responsible for filing about 95% of these cases while 
operating companies—ones that produce products—made up only 5%.33 So, 
why are NPEs flocking to the Eastern District? 
The Eastern District of Texas has developed a reputation for being 
plaintiff-friendly in patent litigation cases. The Eastern District is also known 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, 2013 
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014) [hereinafter The AIA 500]. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, § 299(a). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  The AIA 500, supra note 26, at 43. 
 31.  2015 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW REPORT, supra note 4. 
 32.  2015 PATENT DISPUTE REPORT, supra note 9. 
 33.  Id. 
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for having generous juries and procedural rules that favor patent holders.34 
This reputation came about because of one federal district judge in Marshall, 
Texas.35 
In the mid-1980’s, Texas Instruments (TI) was nearing bankruptcy and 
decided to generate more revenue by suing other technology giants for patent 
infringement of different patents in its patent portfolio.36 TI successfully 
litigated these suits and began generating about $400 million a year from this 
practice.37 However, in the early 1990s, TI’s hometown district court, the 
Northern District of Texas in Dallas, had a docket clogged with criminal drug 
cases that slowed the progress of TI’s patent infringement cases.38 Luckily, 
venue law regarding patent infringement in the early 1990s allowed TI to 
select a different venue as long as TI met certain conditions.39 In taking 
advantage of this venue standard, TI searched and found a suitable forum in 
the Eastern District of Texas court in Marshall, Texas.40 At the time, criminal 
cases on the docket in Marshall comprised only about 10% of the total 
docket.41 Subsequently, TI filed its first patent infringement case in the 
Eastern District of Texas in 1992.42 Happy with the results of the case, TI 
continued to file cases in Marshall.43 One such case was against Hyundai, 
who appointed then-lawyer T. John Ward to defend them.44 Mr. Ward’s loss 
in this case, in conjunction with experience in patent cases as a federal judge, 
shaped his view of how these cases should be adjudicated.45 
Judge T. John Ward set rules to expedite patent cases, such as limiting 
the number of pages lawyers could file in their motions, setting strict 
timetables for hearings, and establishing strict time restrictions during 
presentations in the courtroom.46 Judge Ward’s reasoning behind these rules 
was simple: once three or four major claims have been decided, the rest will 
follow the same pattern.47 Other judges in the district followed suit.48 These 
 
 34.  Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation and 
Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 43 (2010). 
 35.  Steffy, supra note 3. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 40.  Steffy, supra note 3. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
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rules led to expedited cases and, with plaintiff-friendly juries, subsequently 
led to the Eastern District’s reputation as one of the most desirable courts in 
the nation to bring patent lawsuits.49  
This plaintiff-friendly reputation has led to many NPEs filing their 
patent infringement cases in the Eastern District.50 This decision usually pays 
off for NPEs, as the Eastern District’s juries on average deliver a patent 
infringement judgment around $9.4 million.51 If broken down even further, 
to individual judges in the Eastern District Court, Judge Rodney Gilstrap—
who hears the most patent cases—has an average award of $15 million per 
case, with the second highest plaintiff success rate in the nation.52 Judge Ron 
Clark has an average award of $6.9 million, with a 73% plaintiff success 
rate.53 These conditions are so desirable that, when facing a potential venue 
restriction in 2016, NPEs rushed to file in the Eastern District midway 
through 2015.54 It is because NPEs strive for these conditions so aggressively 
that lawmakers want to restrict the current venue laws controlling patent 
infringement cases. 
C. The Fork in the Yellow Brick Road: § 1391 or § 1400(b)? 
The general venue statutes controlling civil cases in federal courts can 
be found in Title 28, Chapter 87 of the U.S. Code.55 In 1897, Congress passed 
an act that specifically addressed venue in patent infringement cases.56 This 
act can now be found under § 1400(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code.57 Thus, 
there are two statutes that may control venue in patent infringement cases 
under Title 28: § 1400(b) and § 1391.58 Specifically, § 1400(b) states: “Any 
civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district 
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
 
 49.  Id. The Eastern District of Texas has the highest success rate for plaintiffs in the nation at 54% 
and has a median damages award value of $9.4 million. See CHRIS BARRY ET AL., 2016 Patent Litigation 
Study: Are We at an Inflection Point?, PWC (May 2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 50.  BARRY ET AL., supra note 49. 
 51.  Id. at 15. 
 52.  Id. at 17. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  RPX RATIONAL PATENT, 2015 NPE ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTS 9 (Mar. 21, 2016), available at 
https://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/RPX-2015-NPE-Activity-Highlights-
FinalZ.pdf. 
 55.  See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1390–1413 (2011). 
 56.  Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (An Act defining the jurisdiction of the US 
District Courts for cases involving infringement of patents). 
 57.  28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
 58.  See generally id. §§ 1391(b), 1400(b). 
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infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”59 Section 
1391(b) allows for a proper venue for a civil action in any forum in which 
the defendant resides.60 Section 1391(c)(2) defines residency for businesses 
as:  
 
An entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common 
name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, 
shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial 
district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s 
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in 
question and, if a plaintiff, only in the judicial district in 
which it maintains its principal place of business.61 
 
Section § 1400(b) is deemed to be specific to patent infringement cases, 
while § 1391(b) is a more general venue provision.62 The conflict between 
the two provisions first appeared before the Supreme Court in 1957.63  
In Fourco v. Transmirra, Transmirra Products Corporation sued Fourco 
Glass Company, a West Virginia corporation, in the Southern District of 
New York for patent infringement.64 Although Fourco had a regularly 
established place of business within the Southern District, it moved to 
dismiss due to lack of proper venue on the basis that none of the alleged 
infringement occurred there.65 The District Court interpreted § 1400(b) to be 
solely controlling over patent infringement cases and, based on no showing 
that Fourco infringed in New York, granted the motion for dismissal.66 The 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 1391(c) controls the definition of 
the term “corporate residence” found in § 1400(b).67 When read together, the 
Court of Appeals held that the statutes allowed Fourco to be sued in New 
York where the company conducts business.68 The United States Supreme 
Court began its analysis by revisiting Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd 
Co., a case involving the issue of whether a venue statute applying 
 
 59.  Id. § 1400(b). 
 60.  Id. § 1391(b). 
 61.  Id. § 1391(c)(2). 
 62.  Andrew Williams, In re TC Heartland (Fed. Cir. 2016), PATENT DOCS (May 5, 2016), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2016/05/in-re-tc-heartland-fed-cir-2016.html. 
 63.  See generally Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
 64.  Id. at 223. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
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specifically to patent infringement was the sole governing provision for 
venue in those cases.69 The Court held in Stonite that Congress’ intention in 
passing the specific venue statute for patent infringement cases was to 
provide venue jurisdiction not for all civil litigation, but for patent 
infringement cases specifically.70 Barring any substantive change by 
Congress in the statute, the Court held that the specific venue statute, 
§ 1400(b), is controlling over the general statute, § 1391(c).71  
Congress quickly responded to the Court’s ruling in Fourco shortly 
after the decision.72 In 1988, Congress amended § 1391(c) to read “[f]or 
purposes of venue in this chapter” at the beginning of the paragraph.73 The 
legislative history revealed Congress’ concern with a party’s residence for 
venue consideration, particularly a corporation’s residence.74 The main 
worry was the breadth of “residence” that a multidistrict corporation would 
have for venue consideration under the then § 1391(c), where a corporation 
could be said to reside anywhere that it was “incorporated, licensed to do 
business, or doing business.”75 The committee in charge of the Act concluded 
that a corporation’s residence should be limited to forums where the 
corporation availed itself of the forum’s personal jurisdiction.76 For 
multidistrict corporations not incorporated or licensed to do business in a 
specific forum, this means restricting venue to districts in which the 
corporation confines its activities.77 
Shortly after the amendment, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit heard VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.78 VE Holding 
sued Johnson Gas Appliance in two separate suits in California for direct and 
contributory infringement and inducement to infringe the VE patents.79 
Johnson, an Iowa company, moved for dismissal in each suit due to improper 
venue.80 The Northern District of California granted the motions, holding 
that Johnson did not ““reside”“ in the district according to the definition 
 
 69.  Id. at 224. 
 70.  Id. at 225. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Judicial Improvements & Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4669 
(codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988)). 
 73.  Id. § 1013. 
 74.  See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889 (1998), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6031. 
 75.  See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 70. 
 76.  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 70. 
 77.  See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 70. 
 78.  See generally VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
abrogated by TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 79.  Id. at 1576. 
 80.  Id. 
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under § 1400(b), rejecting VE Holding’s argument that the 1988 amendment 
to § 1391(c) redefined the term “reside” in § 1400(b).81 VE Holding appealed 
each dismissal, and the Federal Circuit subsequently consolidated the 
appeals.82  
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s reliance 
on the non-specific language of § 1391(c) and Congress’ subsequent 
amendment to the provision.83 Congress’ addition of the beginning phrase 
clarified the previous ambiguity in § 1391(c) and clearly stated the provision 
was to be used for all venue purposes under chapter 87, including 
§ 1400(b).84 The Federal Circuit found that the words of the newly amended 
statute were clear and unambiguous, so as not to require inquiry into 
congressional intent.85 Despite this finding, the court addressed the lack of 
legislative history concerning how the amendment to § 1391(c) would affect 
§ 1400(b).86 The court further stated that the silence in the legislative history 
does not detract from the clear meaning of the amended § 1391(c).87 The 
circuit court held that § 1391(c) expressly reads itself into and only defines 
a term in § 1400(b).88 As such, the Federal Circuit concluded that § 1391(c) 
governed what “resides” means in § 1400(b).89 This holding lowered the 
standard for venue in patent infringement cases to any forum that has 
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.90  
 In response to this ruling, Congress passed the Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act in December of 2011.91 It made two 
changes regarding venue: the Act, (1) added “[f]or all venue purposes,” to 
§ 1391(c), and, (2) § 1391(a) was amended to say “[a]pplicability of section 
— except as otherwise provided by law.”92 The congressional intent of this 
amendment to § 1391(a) was to follow law—current at the time of the 
amendment—regarding requirements for general venue choices.93 The 
purpose was clear, though, to not displace special venue rules under 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 1575–76. 
 83.  Id. at 1578. 
 84.  Id. at 1578–79. 
 85.  Id. at 1579–80. 
 86.  Id. at 1581. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 1579. 
 89.  Id. at 1581. 
 90.  Williams, supra note 62. 
 91.  See generally Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, H.R. 394, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  H.R. REP. NO. 112-10 (2011). 
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particular federal statutes.94 Congress also made it clear that § 1391(c) was 
to apply to all federal venue statutes.95 
 The courts’ struggle with patent venue continued in In re TC 
Heartland.96 Kraft Foods Group (Kraft), a Delaware-incorporated and 
Illinois-based company, sued TC Heartland, an Indiana-based company, in 
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.97 Kraft alleged that TC 
Heartland infringed on three Kraft patents with its water enhancer products.98 
TC Heartland moved for either dismissal for improper venue, or transfer to 
the Southern District of Indiana.99  
 At the district court, TC Heartland argued that it was not licensed to 
do business in Delaware, that it had no presence in Delaware, and that it had 
not entered into supply contracts in Delaware, or otherwise availed itself of 
Delaware’s jurisdiction.100 TC Heartland did admit to shipping some of the 
accused products into Delaware based on national accounts rather than local 
ones.101 The magistrate judge determined that the court had specific personal 
jurisdiction over TC Heartland in claims arising from the accused products 
in Delaware.102 The judge further rejected TC Heartland’s argument that 
Congress’ 2011 amendment to § 1391 nullified the Federal Circuit’s holding 
in VE Holding Corp.103 The district court adopted the magistrate’s position 
in all aspects, and denied TC Heartland’s motions.104   
 On appeal to the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus, TC 
Heartland had two arguments: that it did not “reside” in Delaware for 
§ 1400(b), and that the Delaware district court lacked specific personal 
jurisdiction over it.105 Regarding venue, TC Heartland argued that the 
Federal Circuit’s holding in VE Holding no longer applied in light of 
Congress’ 2011 amendment to §§ 1391(a) and (c).106 The Federal Circuit 
 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See generally In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 97.  Id. at 1340. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. In 2013, these shipments only accounted for 2% of TC Heartland’s total sales of the accused 
products. Id. This small percentage, however, came from 44,707 cases of the accused products amounting 
to $331,000 in sales. Id. 
 102.  In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1340. The magistrate judge relied on precedent from the 
Federal Circuit in Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp. Id.; see generally Beverly Hills Fan 
Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 103.  In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1340. 
 104.  Id. at 1340–41. 
 105.  Id. at 1341. 
 106.  Id. 
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rejected this argument.107 The changes Congress made in the amendment as 
“relevant to this appeal were minor.”108 If anything, the court stated the 
change in § 1391(c) in 2011 was a broadening in its applicability to the rest 
of the chapter rather than a narrowing, as TC Heartland had suggested.109 
 TC Heartland further argued that the change in § 1391(a), particularly 
the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” language, renders § 1391 
inapplicable to patent infringement cases as § 1400(b) would be 
controlling.110 The court rejected that argument as well, finding that 
§ 1400(b) does not itself define corporate residency, and thus, there is no 
“law” that directly conflicts with § 1391(c) and renders it inapplicable to 
patent cases.111 The court also rejected TC Heartland’s argument that 
Congress intended to include federal common law in what could otherwise 
define corporate residence and preclude § 1391(c)’s applicability to patent 
law.112 Despite making this argument, TC Heartland presented no common 
law that would define corporate residency.113 The court refused to 
incorporate the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco as a law that would 
preclude plaintiff’s use of § 1391 for patent infringement venue, reasoning 
that § 1391’s congressional history—particularly its 1988 amendment—
coupled with the court’s decision in VE Holding render Fourco inapplicable 
to patent cases.114  
 Regarding specific personal jurisdiction, TC Heartland argued that 
the Delaware district court only had specific personal jurisdiction over 
claims that arose from the accused products in Delaware—about 2% of TC 
Heartland’s total sales.115 TC Heartland argued for the combination of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling: that specific personal jurisdiction can only arise 
from occurrences or activities taking place in the forum state, and that each 
patent infringement gives rise to a separate cause of action, which is clarified 
by Federal Circuit case law.116 TC Heartland argued that this logical 
combination leads to the conclusion that the Delaware district court only has 
jurisdiction over the accused products that TC Heartline directly sent to 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. TC Heartland argued that the “law” already defines corporate residency and that its direct 
conflict with § 1391(c) renders § 1391(c) inapplicable to patent infringement cases. Id. 
 111.  Id. at 1342.  
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 1342–43. 
 115.  Id. at 1343. 
 116.  Id.; see also Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (explaining that specific jurisdiction 
is dependent on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying case) (citation omitted). 
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Delaware.117 The court also rejected this argument, stating that the argument 
regarding the connection between proper venue, and that due process was 
foreclosed by the court’s decision in Beverly Hills Fan Co.118 Due process 
requires a defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum state.119 As 
such, due process is satisfied where a non-resident defendant ships accused 
products directly to the forum state through an established channel, and 
where the claims against the defendant arise from these products.120 The 
court denied TC Heartland’s petition for writ of mandamus.121 
 In re TC Heartland left patent infringement venue jurisdiction as 
follows: the general statute § 1391(c) defines corporate residency for 
purposes of the specific patent venue statute § 1400(b). Thus, for patent 
infringement cases, any corporation can be sued in any forum that has 
personal jurisdiction over the corporation. Specific personal jurisdiction over 
a corporation can attach if the corporation directly ships infringing products 
into the forum district. This standard is generally a low bar to overcome. 
A. Stopping the Bullet Train: The VENUE Act 
Although the Supreme Court ruled that § 1391(c) defines residency in 
§ 1400(b), there is still dispute over whether a broad interpretation of venue 
in patent cases is fair.122 Prior to the Court’s decision in In re TC Heartland, 
the House of Representatives introduced a bill titled the Innovation Act, 
which would amend the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.123 In the 
proposed Act, the bill-writers included inter alia an amendment to § 1400(b) 
that more expressly defined venue for patent cases.124 The venue amendment 
of the Act sought to limit districts where a plaintiff may bring a patent suit.125 
 
 117.  In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1343. 
 118.  Id. TC Heartland did not challenge jurisdiction under Delaware’s long-arm statute, and thus, 
the court assumed that TC Heartland was challenging jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause. Id. at n.3; see also Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that purposeful minimum contacts with the forum state ensures that 
out-of-state defendant’s 14th Amendment due process rights are not violated). 
 119.  In re TC Heartland, 821 at 1344. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 1345. 
 122.  See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. S1591-01 (introducing a bill to ensure that venue in patent cases is 
“fair and proper”). 
 123.  See Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 124.  See id. This is one of two comprehensive patent reform acts recently introduced in Congress 
and includes amendments to a large portion of title 35 of the United States Code. Id. The other is the 
Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act, which suffered a similar fate. See 
Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015) (detailing the 
PATENT Act, a bipartisan comprehensive patent reform effort). 
 125.  See H.R. 9 § 3. 
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Despite early favor for this Act and its many provisions, opposition within 
Congress, echoed by interested parties, stalled the Innovation Act at the end 
of the 2015 term.126  
Even with the Innovation Act and other comprehensive patent reform 
acts stalled, legislators are attempting to make progress in controlling NPEs 
through smaller, narrower bills that limit different aspects of NPE 
behavior.127 For example, the Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) 
Act aims to provide protection from “abusive” demand letters sent from 
NPEs.128 Another is the Trade Protection Not Troll Protection (TPTP) Act 
whose goal is to reduce the amount of complaints filed by NPEs in the 
International Trade Commission.129  
Similarly, Senators Jeff Flake, Cory Gardner, and Mike Lee introduced 
a bill that focused solely on the patent venue issue—the Venue Equity and 
Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE) Act—in March of 2016 as an 
attempt to narrow proper venue for patent infringement.130 Although this bill 
is still in the early stages of the legislative process, it proposes several 
measures to limit venue in patent cases to what the senators deemed “fair and 
proper.”131 The bill suggests the removal and replacement of § 1400(b) with 
specific language that sets forth requirements for venue in patent 
infringement cases.132 Among these requirements, subsection (b)(5) seems 
to be aimed at reducing litigation initiated by NPEs in plaintiff-friendly 
jurisdictions such as the Eastern District of Texas.133 It sets out three 
 
 126.  See H.R. REP. NO. 114-235 (2015). The Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship 
held hearings regarding the Innovation Act in February of 2016, but no further action has since been 
taken. See All Actions H.R. 9-114th Congress (2015–2016), CONGRESS; 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/9/all-
actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr9%22%5D%7D&r=1&overview=closed#tabs (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
 127.  See, e.g., Trade Protection Not Troll Protection Act, H.R. 4829, 114th Cong. (2016); Targeting 
Rogue and Opaque Letters Act, H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 128.  See H.R. 2045 (allowing courts to impose sanctions or reduced damages if parties have 
improperly sent demand letters and subjecting non-compliant parties to penalties under the Federal Trade 
Commission). 
 129.  See H.R. 4829 § 3(a)(1) (requiring that, to show an affected industry, the complainant may not 
rely on the activities of its licensees unless the license “leads to the adoption and development of articles” 
that integrate of the patent claimed). 
 130.  See 162 CONG. REC. S1591-01; see also Venue Equality and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act, 
S. 2733 (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 17, 2016). 
 131.  See 162 CONG. REC. S1591-01; see also S. 2733 
 132.  See S. 2733. 
 133.  See id. The full amendment proposed states: 
(b)  Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c) of section 1391, any civil action for 
patent infringement or any action for a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid 
or not infringed may be brought only in a judicial district- 
(1) where the defendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated; 
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instances where a venue is proper in the jurisdiction which “a party” has 
established a physical facility.134 This section of the proposed amendment 
requires that the party actually uses the physical facility in a significant way 
related to the patent involved in the suit.135 This requirement seems to be 
aimed at preventing NPEs from using scarcely-utilized facilities to establish 
venue in desirable forums.136 
Adjusting § 1400(b) to limit unwanted NPE litigation behavior in this 
fashion does not come without risks of unfairly prejudicing plaintiffs and 
further complicating venue laws for patent infringement. Evaluating the 
current and proposed venue statutes is essential to reaching an answer that 
will minimize these risks, while still achieving fairness for all parties 
involved in this type of litigation. 
III. EVALUATING THE HIGHWAY: ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT 
AND PROPOSED VENUE LAWS 
A. But First, the Other Roads: Other Special Venue Statutes and 
Their Functionality 
The issue remains between those that want to legislatively narrow venue 
for patent cases and those that believe that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
In re TC Heartland was correct.137 To analyze whether venue should be so 
 
(2) where the defendant has committed an act of infringement of a patent in suit 
and has a regular and established physical facility that gives rise to the act of 
infringement; 
(3) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be sued in the instant action; 
(4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit conducted research or 
development that led to the application for the patent in suit; 
(5) where a party has a regular and established physical facility that such party 
controls and operates, not primarily for the purpose of creating venue, and has- 
(A) engaged in management of significant research and development of an 
invention claimed in a patent in suit prior to the effective filing date of the patent; 
(B) manufactured a tangible product that is alleged to embody an invention claimed 
in a patent in suit; or 
(C) implemented a manufacturing process for a tangible good in which the process 
is alleged to embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit; or 
(6) in the case of a foreign defendant that does not meet the requirements of 
paragraph (1) or (2), in accordance with section 1391(c)(3). 
 
Id. 
 134.  See S. 2733. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  See generally id. 
 137.  Compare BILL FOSTER, BIPARTISAN BICAMERAL GROUP HIGHLIGHTS BROAD OPPOSITION TO 
SWEEPING ANTI-PATENT LEGISLATION MOVING THROUGH CONGRESS (July 14, 2015), 
https://foster.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/bipartisan-bicameral-group-highlights-broad-
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broad as to allow what some call “forum shopping,” it is helpful to study 
other special venue statutes and the situations that they arise in.138 Five 
different special venue statutes—four of which are from the same title as 
§ 1400(b) and § 1391(c)—are compared here: 28 U.S.C. § 1394; 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1396; 28 U.S.C. § 1398; 28 U.S.C. § 1401; and 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
In suits by national banks to enjoin the Comptroller of Currency from 
certain actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1394 states that such civil actions may be 
brought in the judicial district where the banking association is located.139 
The Office of the Comptroller of Currency is a bureau within the United 
States Department of the Treasury that regulates and supervises national 
banks, and may take supervisory actions against national banks that do not 
comply with federal regulations.140 Thus, national banks and thrifts can bring 
suits to enjoin the Comptroller from imposing these sanctions if the actions 
might be oppressive in the district where they are located.141  
In civil actions for the collections of internal revenue taxes, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1396 governs venue.142 Under this statute, venue is proper in one of three 
districts: (1) where the tax liability accrues, (2) where the taxpayer resides, 
or (3) where the income tax return was filed.143 These suits are generally 
brought by the government to recover taxes from a taxpayer or an amount 
erroneously refunded out of income taxes.144 Section 1396 is a permissive 
grant of venue where the United States is attempting to collect taxes, but does 
not override the venue given in a particular statute when that statute gives an 
independent basis for venue.145 Such a section is intended to broaden the 
 
opposition-to-sweeping-anti. (stating that “‘[The Innovation Act] would be destructive to our innovation 
economy’”), with Shearman & Sterling LLP, The VENUE Act: Removing the Eastern District of Texas’ 
Stronghold, LEXOLOGY (May 13, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0b4ee7d7-
0c4b-4c6e-801a-3ec6679ab393 (finding reasoning that “[the Innovation Act] would serve to balance 
patent cases more evenly across the courts of the United States.”). 
 138.  See generally Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases: 
Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 67 (2010). 
 139.  28 U.S.C. § 1394 (1948). 
 140.  Mission, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
 141.  First Nat’l Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504, 508 (1920) (stating that national banks can bring 
suit to enjoin the Comptroller “from doing certain things under color of his office declared to be 
threatened, unlawful, arbitrary and oppressive”). 
 142.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1396 (1948). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  See id.; see also United States v. Frost Lumber Indus., Inc. 48 F.2d 285, 285 (W.D. La. 1931). 
 145.  See United States v. Stone, 59 F.R.D. 260, 264 (D. Del. 1973) (holding that § 1396 is not 
mandatory and does not restrict venue in suit under 26 U.S.C. § 7403). 
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selection of proper venues available that the United States can bring a suit to 
collect taxes.146 
In civil actions to enforce, suspend, or set aside the Interstate Commerce 
Commission’s orders, proper venue is outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1398.147 This 
statute limits venue to judicial districts in which either party in the action 
resides or, for businesses, where they have their principal office.148 The 
purpose of this venue statute is to prevent separate suits in each state where 
any defendants might have resided.149 This statute does not apply to venue 
for suits under 49 U.S.C. § 16 to recover damages; it is only applicable to 
suits regarding Interstate Commerce Commission orders.150  
In shareholders’ derivative actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1401 dictates that 
proper venue is in the judicial district where “the corporation might have 
sued the same defendants.”151 These actions are typically brought by 
stockholders or shareholders against the officers or directors of the 
corporation for violating the officers’ or directors’ fiduciary duty to the 
corporation.152 These cases are unique situations in corporate law, as the 
officers or directors are responsible for bringing and defending the 
corporation against lawsuits instead of the shareholders.153 The corporation 
itself is a party to these suits as the right to sue rests with the corporation 
rather than the shareholders.154 As such, special procedural rules, including 
a special venue statute, allow for the corporation’s interests to be protected 
from harm from its officers.155 
 In anti-trust matters, 15 U.S.C. § 15 states that venue is proper in 
districts where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent and can bring 
a suit without respect to the amount in controversy.156 Courts have found that 
the specific statute supplements the general venue statute found in 28 U.S.C. 
 
 146.  See id. at 264 (explaining that if § 1396 restricted venue, it would “substantially emasculate the 
efficacy” of other statutes such as 26 U.S.C. § 7403). 
 147.  28 U.S.C. § 1398 (1992). 
 148.  See id. 
 149.  United States v. United States Freight Co., 80 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D.C.N.Y. 1947). 
 150.  Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Anderson-Tully Co., 256 U.S. 408, 413 (1921). 
 151.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1948). 
 152.  See Derivative Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 153.  See, e.g., Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code 21.401 (West through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 141 (West through 80 L. 2016). 
 154.  See generally Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970) (explaining that the shareholder has 
a right to sue on behalf of the corporation to recover damages for the corporation’s cause of action against 
the third party). 
 155.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (allowing shareholders to bring derivative actions on behalf of the 
corporation in a venue “where the corporation might have sued the same defendants”). 
 156.  15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). 
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§ 1391.157 Courts reasoned that the congressional intent behind this statute 
was to broaden the plaintiff’s choices for venue and allow recovery for harms 
done by the defendants.158 
 Each of these unique situations requires a special venue statute, rather 
than simply relying on § 1391, to protect the interests of the parties or handle 
the potential conflict that can arise from the situation.159 These instances 
typically involve either a government entity or a potentially unconstitutional 
conflict, and thus merit a venue statute that can circumvent possible 
injustice.160 Cases that can properly function and protect the parties’ rights 
with the general venue statute, however, do not necessitate a special venue 
statute. To determine whether § 1400(b) is necessary and effective, we must 
evaluate its language and the peculiarity of the situations in which patent 
infringement cases arise.  
B. Road Construction: The Difference Between § 1400(b) and 
the Other Special Venue Statutes 
 The language in § 1400(b) is similar to some of the aforementioned 
statutes and dissimilar to others.161 The similarities and differences in the 
language and situations in which these special venue statutes arise are the 
basis for reaching a solution in defining the scope of venue in patent cases. 
To begin, the term “resides” in § 1400(b), defined by § 1391(c) according to 
In re TC Heartland, is a key focus point in venue debates.162 Among the other 
special venue statutes, 15 U.S.C. § 15 and 28 U.S.C. § 1396 use a variation 
of this word.163 To reiterate, § 15 was held to be supplemental to the general 
venue statute § 1391, and is intended to broaden the available venues in 
 
 157.  See Go-Video Inc., v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Grappone, 
Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H. 1975)) (stating that the “‘special anti-trust 
venue statute is supplemented by general venue statute’”). 
 158.  See Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 206 (1966) (stating that there is no legislative intent 
behind the specific venue statute that prevents the “natural reading” of the general and specific venue 
statutes together). 
 159.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1401. 
 160.  See, e.g., id. §§ 1396, 1401. 
 161.  Compare id. § 1400(b) (1999) (stating that venue is proper where a defendant resides or where 
the infringement occurred and the defendant has “a regular and established place of business”), with id. 
§ 1394 (1948) (stating that venue is proper “where such association is located”), and id. § 1396 (stating 
that venue is proper in “the district of the taxpayer’s residence”), and id. § 1398 (stating that venue is 
proper “only in a judicial district in which any of the parties bringing the action resides”), and 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15 (stating that venue is proper in a district where the “defendant resides or is found or has an agent”). 
 162.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); see also In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 163.  See 15 U.S.C. § 15; 28 U.S.C. § 1396. 
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which a plaintiff can bring suit.164 Similarly, § 1396 is meant to be a 
permissive grant of additional proper venues for the United States to bring 
suit.165 In a similar manner, § 1400(b) does broaden venue in patent cases to 
include districts where the defendant committed infringing acts and has an 
established place of business.166 This interpretation broadens venue in much 
the same way as § 1396. In light of these similarities and no clear legislative 
intent to the contrary, there appears to be no reason for § 1400(b) not to be 
held as supplemental to and broaden the general venue statute § 1391(c). 
Statutory interpretation, however, is not the only means of evaluating 
the purpose and utility of § 1400(b). There is a difference between the 
aforementioned venue statutes and § 1400(b) in the way that the relevant 
causes of action arise. Collecting taxes and rebutting enforcement of 
Interstate Commerce Commission orders involve specific government 
workings that differ from typical civil suits. Shareholder’s derivative actions 
involve persons bringing suits that normally do not do so. These suits are 
distinctly different than the typical plaintiff-defendant suit. Patent 
infringement suits are brought by entities that have normally have legal right 
to bring suit and involve the awarding of damages or injunctive relief.167 
Anti-trust suits are the most closely related to patent infringement, yet courts 
have held that the specific venue statute governing those suits are 
supplemental to the general venue statute.168 The purpose behind the 
supplementation, as courts have said, was to broaden the plaintiff’s choices 
when attempting to attain relief.169 Patent infringement, on the other hand, is 
much closer to a tortious property action.170 In many ways, patent 
infringement is akin specifically to either conversion or trespass.171 The 
infringer “takes” property that does not belong to the infringer and uses it. 
Although the patent owner retains “possession” of the patent, the patent 
 
 164.  See Go-Video Inc., v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1989); see generally Pure 
Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966). 
 165.  See United States v. Stone, 59 F.R.D. 260, 264 (D. Del. 1973). 
 166.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
 167.  See generally id. §§ 271, 283, 284; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010); id. § 283 (1952); id. § 284 
(2012). 
 168.  See Go-Video Inc., 885 F.2d at 1412; see also Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 
F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H. 1975). 
 169.  See generally Pure Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 202. 
 170.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention” infringes on the patent), with O’CONNOR’S, TEXAS CAUSES OF ACTION Ch. 6 § 
1.1 (stating that for conversion, the plaintiff must show that “the defendant wrongfully exercised 
dominion or control over the property”). 
 171.  See 15 TEX. JUR. 3d Conversion § 1 (stating that conversion is the unlawful exercise of 
dominion over another’s property inconsistent with the other’s rights); see also 70 TEX. JUR. 3d Trespass 
to Realty § 1 (stating that an invasion on a property right is a trespass). 
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owner loses benefits from the “converted” property rights. Common relief 
for these torts includes monetary damages for the property lost and 
injunctions to prevent future trespass.172 These are also the types of relief 
available to patent owners for patent infringement.173  
With patent infringement’s similarity to tort law, the distinction that 
justifies special venue statutes in shareholders derivative suits, suits to 
collect taxes, or to cease an order from the Interstate Commerce 
Commissioner is not present in patent infringement suits. Patent 
infringement suits arise from tortious action between two parties seeking 
normal forms of relief in court. Despite this, there is still concern that the 
general venue statute is unfair.174 This unease resonates in the VENUE 
Act.175 
C. Pushing the Limits: How the VENUE Act is Pushing the 
Boundaries 
1. “I Think You Are In My Seat”: Imposing On the Plaintiffs 
The VENUE Act attempts to balance “fairness” for all parties involved 
in a suit. In doing so, however, the act is imposing restrictions on all 
plaintiffs, not just the NPEs targeted by the act. This conclusion is readily 
evidenced by the language of the act itself.176 By simply using the phrase 
“party” in subsection (b)(5), the act does not limit the restrictions proposed 
in this subsection to NPEs.177 This is a restriction that has not and need not 
be placed on already-injured parties. 
To address the VENUE Act’s apprehension regarding fairness in patent 
infringement suits, fairness for defendants is established by making venue 
proper only in jurisdictions where the forum has personal jurisdiction over 
the parties.178 If a defendant corporation avails itself of a judicial district’s 
jurisdiction, either by operating physical facilities or merely shipping 
 
 172.  See 15 TEX. JUR. 3d Conversion § 55 (stating that remedies for conversion include the value of 
the property or the property’s return and damages for loss of the property’s use); see also 70 TEX. JUR. 
3d Trespass to Realty § 22 (stating that the owner of a property may recover damages for trespass); 70 
TEX. JUR. 3d Trespass to Realty § 28 (stating that a property owner may recover injunctive relief for 
trespass). 
 173.  See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (granting courts the power to award injunctive relief against an infringing 
party); see also id. § 284 (allowing the court to award compensatory and treble punitive damages for 
patent infringement). 
 174.  See generally In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 175.  See 162 CONG. REC. S1591-01; see also Venue Equality and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act, 
S. 2733, 114th Cong. (2016) (as introduced in the Senate, Mar. 17, 2016). 
 176.  See S. 2733. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  See, e.g., In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1344. 
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products into the district, it should be reasonable for the corporation to expect 
that it can be sued in that district.  
 Likewise, limiting proper venue for a plaintiff only to districts where 
the plaintiff has a physical facility—as proposed in the Innovation and 
VENUE Acts—pushes a boundary of fairness that need not be pushed. When 
a plaintiff brings a suit in a district, the plaintiff consents to the jurisdiction 
of the district and impliedly concedes that the venue is proper.179 The 
proposed subsection (b)(5) of either proposed act places a requirement for 
venue on the plaintiff that is not traditionally seen.180 This section states that 
the venue must be proper for the plaintiff in the same way that it would be 
proper for the defendant. It further states that the plaintiff’s consent alone is 
not enough to establish venue.181 For four of the six subsections of the 
proposed amendment found in the VENUE Act, the bill explicitly refers to 
the defendants in some fashion, whereas, in subsection (b)(5), the 
amendment refers to a “party” when setting the enumerated limitations.182 
The change in wording for subsection (b)(5) seems to suggest that this 
provision is specifically aimed at the plaintiff rather than the defendant.183 
More specifically, this provision is likely aimed at NPEs.184 Subsection 
(b)(5) of the proposed amendments sets out requirements that involve 
substantial use of the physical facility in the development or manufacturing 
of the disputed patent.185 As most NPEs are shell companies, they do not 
normally have physical facilities that operate in a way that could satisfy the 
new provision, effectively limiting the jurisdictions available for them to 
bring suit.186 Although this could be effective in restraining certain NPEs, it 
also shifts the lines of fairness away from injured plaintiffs and imposes yet 
another burden that they must bear. As such, any solution that Congress 
adopts to inhibit NPEs also needs to protect other plaintiffs. 
 
 179.  See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581–82 (2013) 
(explaining that “plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select whatever forum they consider most 
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2. Wasn’t That the Conductor’s Job?: The VENUE Act and the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Role 
 A second boundary that the VENUE Act attempts to redefine is to 
include declaratory judgments in its proposed § 1400(b).187 Venue for suits 
seeking declaratory judgments stating that a defendant was infringing on a 
patent or declaratory judgments stating a patent’s invalidity or 
noninfringement is governed by § 1391(c) rather than § 1400(b).188 
Understandably, the inclusion of these types of claims attempts to unify all 
patent cases under one venue statute. However, including suits for a 
declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid would further complicate 
lawsuits in district courts.  
 On the contrary, venue for suits relating to the validity of a patent is 
most proper at the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board (PTAB) and subsequently at the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.189 The PTAB is responsible for conducting post-grant 
proceedings and inter partes review.190 The purpose of these proceedings is 
to allow a third party the opportunity to challenge the validity of one, several, 
or all claims in a patent after the patent was issued.191 In particular, inter 
partes review does not have a statute of limitations that would prevent a 
challenger seeking a declaratory judgment regarding a patent’s validity at the 
PTAB.192 The PTAB is comprised of administrative patent judges who are 
technically trained and have knowledge of patent law.193 It would be unfair 
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to the plaintiff—even possibly the defendant—to allow venue for these 
issues in a court that does not require as high a level of technical expertise as 
the PTAB to decide the technical validity of a patent.  
 The unjust conditions that could be imposed on plaintiffs—the 
already-injured parties who are seeking relief—outweighs the possibility of 
deterring NPEs from the favorable litigation conditions in the Eastern 
District of Texas. Preserving a plaintiff’s right to choose a venue is 
invaluable; however, so is restraining undesirable NPE behavior. A solution 
that does both is ideal. 
IV. THE GPS SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO THE ROAD AHEAD 
A two-part solution that maintains venue fairness for plaintiffs and 
reduces aggressive NPE behavior exists. The first part of the solution to the 
patent infringement venue conflict is simply for Congress to repeal 
§ 1400(b). Although seemingly drastic, removing subsection (b) makes 
sense for two reasons: (1) patent infringement is, in essence, a tort against 
property, and (2) the circumstances that likely gave rise to § 1400(b)’s 
enactment no longer apply. The second part of the solution is to incentivize 
operating companies to attain patent portfolios before NPEs or encourage 
inventors to sell their patents to operating companies. 
A. “Redirecting . . . :” Adjusting the Route, Justly 
1. Is This the Wrong Map?: Maybe Patent Infringement Is Not 
That Special 
 Patents are a claim of ownership over an individual’s idea for a useful, 
novel creation. Patent infringement, then, is essentially a conversion or 
trespass to chattel for a protected form of intangible property. Simply put, 
patent infringement is someone taking someone else’s property and using it 
without permission. This type of malicious act does not warrant the creation 
and enforcement of special venue or procedural rules to protect the patent 
owner any more than a conversion of tangible personal property does. 
Special procedural statutes need only arise in situations where the general 
statutes fail to protect the fairness of litigation and maintain the integrity of 
the parties’ rights.194 This is why § 1396 is effective, as it is unfair for every 
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taxpayer to defend a suit against the IRS at the IRS’ home forum.195 This 
statute allows for taxpayers to defend themselves in a forum that is of 
reasonable cost to them, both financially and temporally. Defending a 
lawsuit against a government entity like the IRS is an atypical situation. 
Defending a tort is not.  
2. Who Needs A Map When You Have A GPS? 
Any attempt to find the solution for the tension between § 1391 and 
§ 1400(b) must consider the reason Congress passed § 1400(b) in 1897. The 
reason behind § 1400(b) can be inferred, however, from the circumstances 
at the time of enactment. The 1897 Act was passed towards the end of the 
Gilded Age.196 It is likely that Congress was attempting to protect businesses 
from patent infringement litigation in venues that would be fundamentally 
unfair. This unfairness is due, not from the characteristics of the venue itself, 
but from the burden on a business caused by litigating in such a distant forum 
from its intended market. This was likely caused by the presence of a stray 
product in the stream of commerce. Transporting attorneys, witnesses, 
documents, inventors, and experts at the time could have proven to be a 
significant expense. The wording in § 1400(b) that states “regular and 
established place of business” prevents that.197 However, subsequent 
amendments to § 1400 only affected § 1400(a), the copyrights portion of the 
statute, rather than § 1400(b).198 As such, the wording remains the same as 
when it was first enacted: “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be 
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business.”199  
A business incorporated in the United States defending a patent 
infringement suit in any venue within the U.S. no longer faces the challenges 
that companies faced over a century ago. The technological strides humanity 
has made since the turn of the 20th century have enabled companies to 
promote and sell their products on a global market with a great amount of 
ease. Gone are the days where salespeople travel door-to-door selling 
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products, and where trains are the fastest mode of transportation. In this 
modern age, defending a suit in a distant forum is no longer a greater burden 
on a company’s finances or time than defending one in their home judicial 
district. The protections that Congress may have given defendants via 
§ 1400(b) are no longer necessary.  
This is not to say, however, that any company can and should 
reasonably expect to defend a patent infringement suit in any venue. Fairness 
must still be a priority. The due process clause of the 14th Amendment 
ensures this. As stated in Beverly Hills Fan, a defendant’s minimum contacts 
with the forum state adequately protect a defendant’s interests involving 
venue in a lawsuit.200 As such, the only relevant inquiry to decide whether 
venue is proper is to ask whether the defendant had sufficient minimum 
contacts with a forum such as the Eastern District of Texas. If the defendant 
does not have sufficient contacts in the Eastern District of Texas, the court 
does not have personal jurisdiction and venue is improper. 
B. Dealing With the Unruly Passengers 
The reason behind the new wave of patent reform, at least the reforms 
focused on in this writing, is not an emerging issue with established 
procedures but rather an issue with the types of parties involved in the suit. 
The problem that these reforms are attempting to correct is potentially unjust 
behaviors by NPEs. As previously stated, there are different types of NPEs 
that use patents.201 There are research and development NPEs, such as 
universities, that license their patents to fund further research. The behavior 
that influenced these proposed reforms come from NPEs that are shell 
companies. These NPEs do not conduct research and patent their own work, 
but rather purchase a patent portfolio that has several patents. Once this type 
of NPE has this portfolio, they search for operating companies that are 
possibly infringing on one of the patents and threaten a lawsuit. This “wait 
and see” behavior, along with aggressive enforcement tactics, is the concern 
of most current patent reform legislation. 
The second part of the proposed two-part solution addresses this 
behavior. Once § 1400(b) is repealed, an incentive needs to be created for 
inventors to assign their patents to operating companies rather than NPEs. 
Additionally, operating companies should have priority in purchasing patent 
portfolios. The concept behind this part of the solution is simple. If non-
research NPEs cannot attain patents, then they are unable to employ such 
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aggressive enforcement tactics that can hamper the productive use of the 
patents. 
Creating incentives for inventors to assign their patents to operating 
companies is key to solving the current dilemma involving NPEs and venue. 
These incentives need only be marginal. The proposed course of action is 
allowing for a below-the-line deduction for the sale of the patent to a 
qualified entity. The reasoning behind this proposal is analogous to the 
reason behind charitable contributions deduction; to incentivize behavior 
that benefits society as a whole. Similar to the charitable contributions 
section of the tax code, this patent sale deduction can be limited to a 
percentage of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income where the excess is 
treated as a sale in the following taxable years.202 Tax deductions for 
charitable donations were instituted when the War Revenue Act of 1917 
passed.203 The purpose behind this deduction was to allow charities to 
survive the on-going war.204 The authors of the act feared that, with the recent 
increase in income tax, wealthy donors would stop making charitable 
contributions.205 To curb this potential behavior, the charitable donation 
deduction was created.206 This type of tax incentive has proven effective, as 
$373 billion was donated to qualifying charities in 2015 alone.207 A tax 
deduction like this could be sufficient to influence inventors to sell their 
patents to operating companies rather than NPEs. An above-the-line 
deduction for a percentage of the patents’ sale price to a qualified entity could 
also be entertained. To become a qualified entity, a company would only 
need to apply for the status with the IRS.   
To give operating companies priority, a patent sale system could be 
implemented online. A government-run website could allow patent owners 
to offer their patents for sale at a listed price. Operating companies would 
register with whichever government entity runs the website, likely the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office or the IRS. Once registered, the 
companies will have priority to view and purchase patents and patent 
portfolios over entities that have not registered. Giving operating companies 
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priority alone could also solve the issue but to a lesser extent. This would 
work best when used in conjunction with the incentive to the inventors.  
This two-part solution resolves the debate over whether patent 
infringement venue laws are too broad. It addresses the core concern behind 
much of the patent reform in Congress today, the non-research type NPEs, 
while eliminating the tension between conflicting statutes.  
V. THE END OF THE ROAD: CONCLUDING THE JOURNEY 
Patent infringement venue laws and NPEs have been the center of a 
passionate debate for several years. A significant portion of legislation 
involving patent law has been aimed at limiting certain types of NPEs by 
imposing unnecessary restrictions on other types of plaintiffs.208 Courts have 
attempted to resolve this conflict, but there still existed strong opposition to 
these decisions, regardless of which side the judgments favored. The issues 
that revolve around NPEs, including the conflicting venue statutes, can only 
be resolved by Congress. Although there are many proposed bills attempting 
to pass, they impose restrictions that need not be imposed. This attempt at 
comprehensive patent reform to contain NPEs that senators deem 
unfavorable may not work. The America Invents Act’s joinder rules did not 
hinder the NPE business model nor calm the popularity of the Eastern 
District of Texas.209  
The reason behind this resilience is simply because the unfavorable 
NPE business structure remains intact. Legislation that addresses the core of 
this business structure—acquiring vast patent portfolios—rather than 
attempting to affect it at other stages is much more likely to succeed. There 
is a balance that must be achieved, however, when trying to limit business 
practices between achieving a goal to benefit society and not invading 
people’s freedom to choosing how to run their businesses. This balance is 
why the two-part solution is so effective. If Congress gives inventors a 
reason to sell their patents to operating companies rather than NPEs, the 
unfavorable NPE business structure will weaken and eventually cease while 
preserving a person’s right to choose how to conduct his or her business. 
Importantly, this solution also maintains a plaintiff’s right to choose a forum 
and venue convenient for them, the injured party seeking justice. Congress 
should introduce and pass a bill proposing this two-part solution to preserve 
personal liberty and finally resolve the ongoing, costly debate over NPEs. 
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